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Abstract 
Guilt is a social emotion that promotes prosocial and moral behaviours. It arises as a result of 
harming another individual, serving as a prompt for the guilty individual to take reparative 
actions, known as restitution. The neural regions that are involved in guilt and restitution, 
however, are not currently known. To identify these regions, we employed a novel social 
decision-making fMRI paradigm involving donations to charities. There was a significant 
positive correlation between trait guilt and BOLD signal in the vlPFC and mPFC during acts of 
restitution. Furthermore, choices of harm when compared to help showed increased BOLD signal 
in the amygdala, insula, and the superior temporal sulcus. The present results are consistent with 
past studies that indicate an important role of the vlPFC and mPFC for processing aversive social 
cues and to resolve decision conflict. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research in Morality and Social Emotions 
Imagine yourself in a situation where a runaway trolley in headed for five railway 
workers and you had the opportunity to save these five workers by pulling a lever that would 
change course of the trolley and would kill one person instead. It is likely that you would find it 
appropriate to pull the lever. What if, instead of pulling the lever, you had to push that person 
onto the track in order to stop the trolley and save the five other people? The decision suddenly 
becomes much harder and you would likely choose not to push the person, despite the fact that 
the overall outcome of the decision remains the same.  Now, what if you were a surgeon that had 
the decision to kill one patient and take their organs in order to transplant them and save five 
other patients? All of a sudden, the answer becomes obvious that you would not do such a thing. 
In all of these scenarios, there appears to be another aspect beyond a simple logical reasoning 
that influences your answer, something that we call morality. 
Morality has been a topic of interest throughout history but was largely reserved for 
philosophy until more recently, where there has been an increasing interest to empirically study 
this concept. Current research has shown that there are two aspects to moral decision making: a 
cognitive and an affective aspect. The cognitive aspect refers to moral reasoning, maximizing 
good while reducing harm, and cognitive perspective taking or theory of mind, the ability to 
view situations from another person’s perspective. The affective aspect refers to the social 
emotions of shame, guilt, empathy, and sympathy. Each of these emotions motivates moral 
behaviours through different manners, for example guilt occurs through a failure to meet one’s 
moral standards whereas shame occurs due to failure of meeting other’s moral standards. In both 
situations, it is a negative emotional response that drives an individual to promote moral 
behaviours, such as choosing not to push a person onto the train tracks to stop the train, even 
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though it serves the aggregate welfare or the greater good. Although there have been more recent 
findings from imaging studies of healthy and of patient populations showing that while there are 
neural regions showing interplay between the two aspects, they are still dissociable from one 
another (Carlo et al. 2012). For example, a study by Greene (2001), showed that people who 
select the utilitarian response, the choice to push the person, have increased activation in areas of 
abstract reasoning and cognitive functions, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and anterior 
cingulate. On the other hand, people who choose not to push the individual show increased 
activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and other areas of the brain that subserve 
emotions, such as the insula. 
1.2 Guilt and Shame 
 The social emotions that govern the affective aspect of morality were once all thought to 
be one fundamental emotion. This was due to the fact that these emotions occur in response to 
very similar situations and are often confused with one another and resulted in them being used 
interchangeably. For example, guilt and shame are the two most commonly interchanged and 
embarrassment was simply thought to be a milder form of shame (Borg, Staufenbiel, & Scherer, 
1988 & Tangney et al., 1996). Tangney et al. (1996) sought to differentiate these emotions from 
one another and characterized these emotions on four themes, the situations that elicit the 
emotions, the feelings associated with the emotion, the cognition during the emotion, and the 
actions that are caused by these emotions. Using these four aspects, they concluded that these 
three emotions were uniquely different, not only in intensity, but in the way each are construed 
and experienced. Since then, these emotions have been characterized through numerous studies. 
Guilt and shame are still frequently confused, but the largest difference between these two 
emotions lies in their function (Tangney & Dearing, 2002 & Carlo et al. 2012).  
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Guilt has been described as the “social mortar” of human society (De Hooge et al., 2011). 
It is involved in the evaluation of the self and occurs when behaviours or actions do not meet 
one’s own moral standards, which ultimately motivates prosocial behaviours (Carlo et al., 2012, 
Tangney & Dearing 2002, Haidt, 2003, Carni et al., 2013). The goal of guilt is to motivate moral 
behaviour and has been found to be highly linked to altruism, the act of helping without any 
expectance of return (Haidt, 2003 & Carni, 2013). On the other hand, shame is a highly negative 
emotion that occurs when one fails to meet the standards of other people (Carlo et al. 2012). It is 
a painful experience that is associated feelings of exposure and belitting of onself, and ultimately 
promotes behaviours to protect one’s self-image (Tangney et al. 1996, Carlo et al. 2012, Carni et 
al. 2013). Guilt and shame, therefore, are distinct emotions that serve separate functions and 
occur in response to different situations. 
1.2.1 Guilt and Moral Behaviours 
It should be apparent that guilt is a social emotion deeply engrossed into the moral realm, 
promoting moral behaviours in people. Berndsen et al. (2004) concluded that guilt arises from 
actions that lead to negative interpersonal consequences, and as the level of interpersonal harm 
increased, so did the feelings of guilt. The helpfulness of guilt in promoting social behaviours 
can be seen in a study by Ketelaar & Tung Au (2003) where participants were asked to describe 
a situation in which they felt guilty, ashamed, or self-blaming prior to playing either the 
prisoner’s dilemma or the ultimatum game. In both cases, individuals who wrote a detailed 
description of the guilty story were more cooperative and were more generous when compared to 
the other two conditions. The types of behaviours guilt promotes and process of how it does so 
may still seem unclear and the literature remains sparse. Carlo et al. (2012), however, sought to 
determine the types of prosocial behaviours elicited by guilt and divided them into 6 types of 
moral categories: altruistic behaviours, public prosocial behaviours, compliant prosocial 
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behaviours, anonymous prosocial behaviours, dire prosocial behaviours, and emotional prosocial 
behaviours. It was found that guilt was positively related to compliant behaviours, that is, 
helping those who request aid, altruistic behaviours, i.e. helping without expecting self-reward, 
dire prosocial behaviours (helping during crisis situations), and emotional helping, which is 
helping during “affectively evocative” contexts. In addition to this, guilt was found to be a 
stronger motivator of these behaviours than sympathy and was negatively related to public and 
aggressive behaviours. Thus it appears that guilt is important in promoting positive behaviours 
while inhibiting negative or “bad” behaviours (Carlo et al., 2012 & Carni et al., 2013). In 
addition to this, it is important to note that guilt specifically promotes these types of behaviours 
and is not due to a general sense of immorality (Cryder et al., 2012). These studies have provided 
empirical evidence for observations made in the past. Individuals that are more prone to guilt 
have been found to have better interpersonal relationships, are less likely to react in anger to 
situations, and are more willing to accept wrongs that they have committed and is linked to 
promoting positive moral development (Tangey & Dearing, 2002 & Berndsen et al., 2004 & 
Laible et al., 2008). Guilt is still a high-order complex emotion that will still require much more 
stringent research in order to fully tease it apart and for us to understand it. 
1.2.2 Physiological Responses of Guilt 
The somatic theory of emotion states that we are able to identify emotions and process 
emotional information by monitoring our bodily responses and labelling it (Wahlund et al., 
2010). While this theory is still faced with much debate and may not be the sole method for 
identifying emotions, it provides a clue towards bodily changes that occur concurrently with 
emotional experiences. For example, individuals who wear heavier backpacks were found to 
show increased guilt, where the physical experience of weight was linked to the subjective 
“weight” of guilt. Individuals wearing heavier backpacks showed reduced likelihood of engaging 
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in guilt-inducing behaviours when compared to those wearing lighter backpacks (Kouchaki et al. 
2013). Furthermore, this avoidance of guilt-inducing behaviours has been found to occur even in 
physiological changes such as heart rate and skin conductance. A study by Oliveira-Silva & 
Goncalves (2011) investigated empathy, a pre-requisite and key component of guilt. In their 
study, emotional empathy was correlated with increased arousal as measured by increased skin 
conductance and cognitive empathy was correlated with increased heart rate. In another study, a 
test called the Guilty Actions Test was used. In the test, participants committed or witnessed a 
mock crime and then were asked to respond to questions that were related to the crime. When 
individuals read answers related to the crime, it was found that skin conductance was increased 
(Gamer et al. 2008). Wahlund et al. (2010) furthered this conclusion by studying physiological 
changes in individuals with antisocial personality disorder. These individuals have long been 
known to have reduced emotional experience, but it was found that this was also reflected in 
attenuated autonomic arousal as well. Therefore, physiological changes that are congruent with 
and accompany emotions are important for and can increase emotional experience (Niedenthal et 
al. 2007, Gamer et al., 2008, Oliveira-Silva & Goncalves, 2011, Kouchaki et al., 2013).  
1.3 Anticipatory Guilt 
 While emotions themselves are able to strongly affect behaviours, they occur in response 
to situations that have already occurred. In the case of guilt, the prosocial behavioural change 
evoked by guilt occurs after the fact of the harming or suffering of an individual. This thought 
appears to be troubling, if harm necessarily needs to precede prosocial behaviours. However, 
there is a concept of emotional avoidance, where the negative experiences of an emotion act as a 
deterrent to employ behaviours that may result in re-experience (Wagner et al. 2012). In the case 
of guilt, we will refer to this concept as anticipatory guilt. The literature on the concept of 
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anticipatory guilt is scarce, thus further research needs to be done to better understand it (Lindsey 
et al., 2005).  
 Most of the studies on anticipatory guilt revolve around organ donation, where 
individuals are asked to decide whether they are willing to sign an organ donor card after reading 
a description about the benefits of donating (Lindsey et al., 2005, Lindsey et al., 2007, Wang, 
2011). In these studies, the presentation of the need of unknown others of donation vary and 
certain guilt inducing sentences or phrases are included into the description. Lindsey et al. (2005) 
found that individuals who predicted higher feelings of guilt if they did not help were more likely 
engage in helping 7-10 days later. Additionally, these individuals that do help felt less guilty than 
those that do not help. In a follow up study, Lindsey et al. (2007) studied whether empathy, the 
precedent for guilt, is related to anticipatory guilt. This is due to the fact that there is no apparent 
reason to alleviate this threat of death (to the unknown other) that has no effect on the individual, 
and thus it is of interest to understand whether empathy is related to anticipatory guilt. Although 
past research suggests that thought alone can induce anticipatory guilt and cause avoidance of 
behaviours that would elicit guilt, this study found no correlation (O’Keefe, 2002). Thus, while 
anticipatory guilt is able to predict organ donation and other prosocial behaviours, further 
research needs to be done with regards to empathy. Wang (2011) confirmed the findings that 
anticipatory guilt increase helping behaviours and does so by influencing attitudes and norms on 
behavioural intentions. Also, it was suggested that anticipatory guilt is more influential on 
behaviours that have a higher and more direct impact on others. In summary, anticipatory guilt 
occurs from the speculation of likely emotional consequences from future behaviours, which 
drives prosocial behaviours by shaping and altering behavioural intentions and ultimately lowers 
feelings of guilt. 
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1.3.1 Neuroimaging data on Anticipatory Guilt 
 To date, there is only one study that has directly looked at the neural correlates during the 
avoidance of guilt. Chang et al. (2011) looked at guilt avoidance with an economical investment 
game. Participants were asked to invest money to another person, whom would then receive four 
times that amount, and decide how much they would expect in return. i.e. A donates 10 dollars to 
B, who receives $40, and A expects a $20 return. In the second part of the study, a subset of the 
original participants played the role of B, while inside an fMRI scanner. The results showed that 
player B was accurate at estimating the amount of money player A was expecting, and thus 
avoided guilt. When this occurred, the insula, supplementary motor area (SMA), dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex (dACC), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), and temporal parietal junction 
(TPJ) were activated. When the estimation was lower than the expectation (increasing selfish 
financial gain), the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), bilateral nucleus accumbens 
(NAcc), and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) were activated. These areas are similar to 
those of neuroimaging data found in guilt, and thus of particular interest are the overlapping 
areas: the insula, SMA, dACC, dlPFC, and TPJ. 
1.4 Deficits of Guilt in Neuropsychiatric Disorders 
Neuropsychiatric disorders that exhibit deficits in guilt have such as frontotemporal 
dementia (FTD) and antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) have provided another perspective 
towards understanding the function of guilt. However, determining the neural basis of guilt in 
healthy individuals may also serve to understand these neuropsychiatric disorders better. 
1.4.1 Frontotemporal Dementia 
 Frontotemporal dementia (FTD) is a unique form of dementia that is characterized by 
atrophy of the frontal and temporal lobes. In addition to this, another unique hallmark of FTD 
patients is progressive and drastic social and personality changes (Mendez et al., 2005, Mendez 
8 
 
et al., 2006). These patients are often found to perform socially inappropriate behaviours that 
border sociopathic behaviours such as unsolicited sexual behaviours, traffic violations, physical 
assaults, stealing, and breaking and entering (Miller et al. 1997, Mendez et al., 2005, & Mendez 
et al. 2006). These changes are particularly pronounced, especially early at the onset of the 
disease, in one of the subtypes of FTD, behavioural variant FTD (bvFTD), where the atrophy is 
focalized to the frontal lobes. The behavioural changes have been studied extensively and have 
been found to stem from a blunting of emotions, loss of empathy, and clinical apathy, where 
emotional blunting refers to things such as emotional shallowness, a lack of concern for others, 
and loss of emotional warmth (Mendez et al., 2006). These deficits in normal aspects of social 
functioning have been found to be correlated with the degree of atrophy. More specifically, these 
areas of atrophy include frontal regions such as the vmPFC, dlPFC, OFC, the anterior insula, and 
anterior cingulate and other areas that have been implicated in theory of mind (ToM) such as the 
temporal parietal junction and the superior temporal gyrus (Eslinger & Moore, 2011, Eslinger et 
al., 2012, Mendez & Shapira, 2011, & Moll et al. 2011). An interesting aspect of this emotional 
blunting and change in behaviour is the fact that these individuals are still able logically reason 
out socially appropriate answers when not limited by time (Moll et al., 2005). In a study where 
FTD patients were asked to make a decision in moral dilemmas, similar to the ones that were 
referred to at the beginning of the introduction, they almost always chose the utilitarian answer, 
that is to sacrifice the lesser for the greater, regardless of the scenario (Moll et al., 2005). The 
investigators classified the patients’ reasoning as “impersonal” and attribute this to a lack of 
emotionality in their reasoning that arises from damage to the vmPFC. It appears that FTD 
patients still have moral and social knowledge and rules and are able to consciously identify 
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them, however, this loss of emotional “colouring” to emphasize certain stimuli is the major 
reason for the inappropriate behaviours. 
1.4.2 Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) 
ASPD is a personality disorder that is characterized by the core traits of callous and 
unemotional personality, including characteristics of lack of empathy or remorse, uncaring 
nature, or shallow emotional responding (Herpertz et al., 2001; Cooke et al., 2005; Frick & 
White, 2008; Marsh et al., 2013). The clinical population of ASPD, however, can be split into 
two sub-populations based upon behavioural patterns, although we will focus only upon of these 
sub-populations. Approximately 30% of the population show a lack of empathy and response, 
instrumental aggression, and deficient affective experience, including guilt (Frick & White, 2008 
& Gregory et al., 2012). This subpopulation has been referred to as psychopathic personality 
disorder (PPD) and these individuals show decreased electrodermal response to punishment or 
anxiety-related stimuli, though to indicate low levels of fear. Additionally, these individuals 
show an absence of startle potentiation, which refers to lack of increased startle response when a 
loud acoustic probe is presented with a negative visual stimuli. In addition to this lack of fear, 
studies have looked this clinical population and found that these individuals have lowered 
responding to emotional slides and a lack of modulation of startle response by any emotional 
stimulus (Herpertz et al., 2001).  This hypoemotionality is thought to predispose these 
individuals to antisocial and inappropriate behaviours (Herpertz et al., 2001). These behaviours 
have been suggested to be linked to the frontal cortices, more specifically the vmPFC and the 
orbitofrontal cortices. Early damage to the vmPFC has been found to result in behaviours similar 
to that of sociopathy and PPD, most importantly showing insensitivity to future consequences of 
decisions (Anderson et al., 1999). Similarly, Blair & Cipolotti (2000) found similar behavioural 
changes in an adult suffering damage to the frontal lobes, including the orbitofrontal cortices. As 
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well, children that show psychopathic traits were shown to have atypical vmPFC activation 
during a reversal learning task, specifically for punished errors (Finger et al. 2008). The guilt 
deficits found in persons with PPD could be due to abnormalities in vmPFC and orbitofrontal 
cortex function, which are important for appropriate social behaviours, empathy, and appropriate 
consideration of future consequences of decisions. Elucidation of the neural regions and 
functions supporting social decision making and guilt would be expected to provide insight into 
the neural basis of guilt and related deficits in neuropsychiatric disorders. 
1.5 Neurocorrelates of Guilt 
While the above patient studies may help to identify the neural regions supporting guilt-
related processing, more recent work has attempted to determine the areas activated in healthy 
populations during the generation of guilt and related social decision-making. Convergent with 
the patient findings described above, these studies have identified specific regions of prefrontal 
cortex, the amygdala and temporal lobes during such tasks. Two fMRI studies have evaluated 
guilt and embarrassment by presenting sentences to participants designed to elicit moral 
emotions. Takahashi et al. (2004) found that social emotions of guilt and embarrassment 
produced activation within neural regions implicated in theory of mind (ToM) processes, the 
medial prefrontal cortex, left posterior superior temporal sulcus, and the visual cortex.  
Elicitation of guilt was associated with higher activation in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), 
a region implicated in monitoring mental states and making moral judgements (Adolphs, 2001; 
Greene & Haidt, 2002; Green et al. 2001). Finger et al. (2006) expanded upon these findings by 
introducing the presence or absence of an audience during scripts read to elicit guilt or 
embarrassment. In doing so, this allowed one to identify regions that may prompt behavioural 
change following a social or moral transgression; where moral transgressions refer to 
transgressions that are considered inappropriate or wrong regardless of the presence of a witness 
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or not (i.e. murder) and social transgressions are wrong only when witnessed (i.e. burping). They 
found that the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 
(dmPFC) showed greater activation regardless of audience presence during moral transgressions 
but only in the presence of an audience for social transgressions. This finding was interpreted in 
the context of previous research that has found that the vlPFC and the dmPFC are important for 
processing aversive social cues and to resolve conflict between incompatible voluntary action 
plans (Blair et al. 1999). As mentioned previously, Chang et al. (2011) studied guilt aversion, to 
determine whether anticipation of guilt motivates prosocial behaviours. In contrast to the 
previous studies mentioned above, when making decisions that should minimize guilt, increased 
activation was found in the insula, supplementary motor area (SMA), dorsal anterior cingulate 
(dACC), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), and the temporal parietal junction (TPJ).  
These studies indicate a role for dorsomedial and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the 
superior temporal sulcus, the insula, anterior cingulate cortex and amygdala in guilt and related 
decision making. A brief review of these areas will now be presented to highlight the general 
cognitive processes currently attributed to each, as well as their more specific role related to 
decision making and moral emotions, specifically guilt. 
1.5.1 Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex 
The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) refers to the medial portions of Broddman 
Areas (BA) 8 and 9. The dmPFC has been found to play a role in error monitoring as well as 
learning and reward processing in complex decision making, leading to adjustments in behaviour 
to optimize reward (Venkatraman et al. 2012). The dmPFC is activated during the Stroop task 
and its variants, where there is conflict between a prepotent response and the task response and 
participants must choose the latter behaviour over the former (Bush et al., 1998; Derrfuss et al., 
2005). In addition to this, the activity in the dmPFC has also been shown to be correlated with 
12 
 
increasing decision conflict. In a study by Pochon and colleagues, male participants were asked 
to pick between two equally attractive female faces or between one attractive and one 
unattractive female face. When asked to choose between two equally attractive faces, that is 
when there is a greater conflict, the dmPFC showed greater activation when compared to the low 
conflict condition (attractive vs unattractive face). The dmPFC is also found to be active when 
actions lead to future errors and my predict error likelihoods even before receiving feedback 
(Ullsperger and von Cramon, 2003; Brown and Braver, 2005). Additionally, Kennerley and 
colleagues (2006) lesioned the dmPFC in macaques and found that they became unable to use 
past reward informations to guide future behaviours (Kennerly et al., 2006). These suggest that 
the dmPFC integrates information about past actions and outcomes and is used to guide future 
behaviours. This is also supported by studies using magnetic resonance tractography and 
functional connectivity which have revealed connections between dmPFC and areas involved in 
multimodal sensory representation, visuospatial processes, and memory (Beckmann et al. 2009; 
Venkatraman et al., 2009b). This puts the dmPFC in a position to modulate various processes in 
the brain to alter behaviour in response to new information (Mitchell et al., 2013). Additionally, 
the dmPFC has strong connections to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, an area important for 
making choices between multiple responses that are contingent upon the context (Miller and 
Cohen, 2011; Taren et al., 2011). Thus, the dmPFC is an area of particular interest in decision 
making due to its role in selecting or biasing certain behaviours based upon past errors and 
knowledge. 
1.5.2 Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex 
The ventrolateral prefrontal cortex in this current study refers to Broddman Area 47. 
Similar to the dmPFC, it has many anatomical connections with various sensory modalities in 
order to influence behaviour, and most notably, with the anterior insula, an area that has been 
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implicated in emotions and decision making (Singer et al., 2009). The vlPFC has been found to 
be activated in reversal learning, particularly in response to punishment cues (Elliot et al., 2000; 
Finger Arch Gen Psychiatry, 2007). Cools et al. (2002) found that activity in the vlPFC occurred 
only in response to errors that prompted subsequent reversal behavioural changes. Additionally, 
this activity has been shown to occur independent of punishment, but rather it is specifically 
responding to sub-optimal behaviours. Mitchell et al. (2009) employed an object discrimination 
task, in which participants had to pick between pairs of images of objects that had a pre-assigned 
point value and were asked to optimize the gain of points, as the point value of the objects 
changed over the course of the study.  The vlPFC was only found to activate in response to sub-
optimal responses, that is when there was a reversal error when participants chose an object in a 
pair that now had a lesser value. The vlPFC has been suggested to play a role in processing 
context relevant stimuli and in modulating behaviours (Mitchell et al., 2013). 
In summary, the dorsomedial and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex have been implicated in 
many cognitive functions, ranging from executive functions such as decision making to emotion 
regulation. In conjunction with these and their findings, Finger et al. (2007) hypothesized that 
these areas may activate in response to aversive cues to facilitate a behavioural change. In that 
study, however, the participants were passively reading the sentences and there was no 
opportunity for active behavioural change in the task. Thus, in the current study, we plan to 
determine whether dmPFC and vlPFC may activate in response to decisions that elicit guilt, 
specifically to prompt or facilitate restitutive actions towards the victim. 
1.5.3 Insula 
The insula is an area of the brain that is highly interconnected to many subcortical and 
cortical areas. Of particular interest to the current study is the anterior portion of the insula, 
which has been found to be important for interoceptive representations of the body and emotions 
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(Shin et al., 2000). The insula has also been implicated in negative affective states such as in 
guilt (Shin et al., 2000) and in disgust (Calder et al., 2000; Wicker et al., 2003). Specifically in 
disgust, the anterior insula was found to play a role in both the experience of the emotion and in 
the perceiving and understanding of the same emotion in others, an important aspect of empathy 
(Wicker, 2003). In support of this, the anterior insula is interconnected with limbic structures 
such as the amygdala, an area implicated in emotional processing, especially of negative 
emotions (Flynn, 1999).  
More recently, it was hypothesized that the insula may reflect the subjective experience 
of emotions and the processing of predicting and representing future uncertainties. In the study 
by Chang et al. (2011), they found that when participants minimized future feelings of guilt, by 
avoiding guilt inducing behaviour in a Trust Game, the insula showed increased activity and the 
resultant pattern of activation within the brain was similar to making decisions of rejecting unfair 
offers in the Ultimatum Game (Sanfey et al., 2003). Ullsperger (2003) found that the anterior 
inferior insula showed greatest activity when receiving negative feedback during a motion 
discrimination task, suggesting a role in responding to negative emotional states elicited by the 
feedback. In conjunction with this, a prior study in our lab found that activity within the anterior 
insula was associated with decisions and feedback in a charity task (Greening et al., 2013). In the 
task, participants were asked to assign losses or gains to either themselves or a charity; however, 
at one-third chance, these assignments of gains or losses would be flipped. That is, there is a one 
in three chance that an assignment of gain could result in a loss. During these unintended 
outcomes compared to intended outcomes, the anterior insula showed greatest activity. 
Furthermore, increase anterior insula activity was associated with a greater tendency to avoid 
harming the charity (avoid taking money from the charity). Together these findings suggest a 
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role in calculation or anticipation of risk, which can influence decision making. Thus it appears 
that the insula has a potential role in emotional decision making, related to avoiding future 
negative feedback and potentially specific emotional states, such as guilt. 
1.5.4 Amygdala 
The amygdala is commonly known as the “fear centre” of the brain, important for 
detecting danger in the environment, and has been studied extensively in this regard in 
nonhuman animals (Adolphs et al., 1999; Sergerie et al., 2007; Todd & Anderson, 2009). More 
recently, however, this view has begun to change in light of new studies in humans. The role of 
the amygdala has been found to not only process negative but also positive emotional stimuli 
(Sergerie et al., 2007 & Anderson, 2009). Emotions act as a guidance cue to biologically relevant 
information, as shown through the attentional blink paradigm. In this paradigm, there is often an 
attentional “blink” where if the two targets are presented temporally proximal enough, the 
second target is often missed. However, if the target has some sort of emotional content, it is less 
likely to suffer from this attentional blink. In patients with amygdala lesions, this benefit of 
emotional content was not found and therefore, affective significance of stimuli may determine 
the fate of visual stimuli (Anderson & Phelps, 2001). 
As a result, the amygdala has been hypothesized to have a role in the detection of 
biological and social relevant information, a “relevance detector” (Sander et al., 2003 & Sergerie 
et al., 2007). Connectivity of the amygdala to various areas within the brain, particularly the 
visual areas, reveals a potential mechanism for a modulatory effect on the processing of 
emotionally-laden stimuli (Schwartz et al., 2002; Cardinal et al., 2002; Sergerie et al., 2007; 
Heimer et al., 2008). Individuals suffering from Kluver-Bucy syndrome with specific bilateral 
amygdala lesion, which has shed much light in this regard. SM, one of these patients, fails to 
identify facial expressions of emotion such as surprise, fear, and anger (Adolphs et al. 1995), and 
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follow up studies have found that this impairment is for all unpleasant emotions in general 
(Adolphs et al. 1999a). In a study where individuals that suffer from amygdala damage were 
compared to controls in an emotion discrimination task, it was found that controls have higher 
amygdala response to fearful faces than neutral whereas individuals with the amygdala damage 
did not (Adolphs et al., 1999b). Thus the amygdala appears to support social networks within the 
brain, thereby influencing the way by which we interact with the social world around us by 
modulating salience based upon emotional content.  
1.5.5 Superior Temporal Sulcus (Temporoparietal Junction) 
The superior temporal sulcus has been implicated to be part of a more general social 
cognition network that is activated during processes that involve other intentional human agents, 
in tasks such as the prisoner’s dilemma game, theory of mental states tasks, and dispositional 
attribution tasks (Singer et al., 2004, Harris et al., 2005, Lee & Harris, 2013). This network has 
also found to be show activation in previous studies that have explored the identification of 
moral or social transgressions (Greene et al., 2001; Takahashi et al., 2004; Finger et al., 2006). 
Particularly, Finger et al. (2006) found that the STS demonstrated significantly greater activity 
during moral transgressions, which were designed to elicit guilt in participants.  
1.6 Thesis Hypothesis 
While many studies have shown that guilt results in more altruistic and helping behaviour 
(Lindsey, 2005; Lindsey & Hill, 2007; Harbaugh et al., 2007), the neural regions supporting the 
emotion of guilt remain to be confirmed, and those supporting acts of restitution have not been 
previously evaluated. In many of the prior studies mentioned above, the participants passively 
read words, sentences, or paragraphs from a screen during fMRI. Therefore, it is also of interest 
to determine whether agency has an effect upon the neural structures implicated in guilt 
generation, given the known links between degree of agency and intensity of guilt feelings 
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(Berndsen et al., 2004). In the current study we will test the hypotheses that 1) dmPFC and 
vlPFC activity during social decision making which harms another reflects processes that 
underlie acts of restitution, and 2) that anticipated and experienced guilt are represented by 
overlapping networks involving the anterior insula, amygdala and temporoparietal junction. We 
will test our hypothesis by examining neural activity using fMRI during a novel social decision-
making task designed to  produce guilt and offer opportunities for  and restitution. 
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Chapter 2 Methods 
2.1 Participants 
 Participants were recruited through posters that were placed on The University of 
Western Ontario campus and were also directly contacted from a participant research pool that 
have participated in previous studies. Participants were screened prior to the study for 
contraindications to MRI and for handedness. Study exclusion criteria included recent 
neuropsychiatric disorders or current medication for the disorder. In total, 23 healthy participants 
were recruited for the study. However, neuroimaging data was available for 18 healthy 
participants; data was unavailable from 5 participants due to scanner dysfunction or a lack of 
response during the scan. In total, there were 9 males and 9 females, all participants were right 
handed, with an average age = 20.28 years (Range: 18-23; S.D.: 1.52). Participants responded to 
91% of the 80 trials (Mean = 72.95; S.D.: 2.36;  Range: 56-80). All participants were provided 
written informed consent. The procedures were approved by The University of Western Ontario 
Research Ethics Board for Health Sciences Research Involving Human Subjects (HSREB 
protocol #13617). 
2.2 fMRI task 
2.2.1 Study Overview 
 The participants performed a novel donation task, where they were given the opportunity 
to donate to individuals of need. Healthy volunteers were contacted and invited to participate in a 
“Social Decision Making Study”. Upon arrival, participants read a set of instructions that 
explained the task paradigm. They were then presented with a list of fictional charities on a 
website, to enhance the believability of the study. They were told that the money would go to 
these charities and would help individuals in need; however, they were also told that a portion of 
money that they choose not to donate would be added as a bonus towards their own 
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compensation for the study. This was to increase the tension between self-rewarding vs. 
prosocial behaviours that is typical of real-world altruistic decisions, and to further intensify the 
corresponding emotions such as guilt that may be evoked by their decisions. The agency of 
participants in making decisions is of interest here due to the positive correlation between agency 
and intensity of feelings of guilt. Following study completion, participants were debriefed on the 
fictitious nature of the charities. 
2.2.2 fMRI Task Design 
The task paradigm (Fig 1) consisted of guilt-inducing scenarios with two conditions, 
active or passive, that were presented to the participant. In both conditions, participants read 
about an individual in need of help from a charity that was paired with a negative image of a 
person from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS). In the active condition, 
participants were given a choice to donate $10 or not donate to that particular charity. A 
feedback screen then appeared, depending on their response, that was designed to either induce 
guilt (further harm to the victim described after a no donation choice) or was neutral (following a 
donation). The participants were then given a second chance to donate. Following our piloting of 
the task, to increase the number of trials where a donation decision was made during choice 2, on 
50% of the trials, the amount to be donated in choice 2 was halved to $5, while for 50% of trials 
the amount remained $10. A second feedback screen appeared after choice 2. In the passive 
condition, donation choices were randomly selected by the computer, so that the number of 
donate and no donate selections was balanced. Participants simply viewed the choices and were 
asked to read the feedback (Appendix 1). Thus, in each trial there were two decisions to donate 
or not donate, resulting in four total possible combinations of responses, where donations are 
“help” and no donations are “harm”: Help/Help, Help/Harm, Harm/Help, and Harm/Harm. 
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In total, there were 80 unique scenarios that described the situations of individuals that 
were in need. All scenarios were balanced in both character and word length. Each scenario was 
presented once in the active condition and once in the passive condition, thus totalling 160 trials 
altogether. Each trial consisted of the presentation of the individual in need two choice screens 
and two feedback screens, together lasting 13.5 seconds Two variable interstimulus intervals of 
either 0.5, 1.5, or 2.5 seconds  were placed between choice and feedback screens to permit 
dissociation of the BOLD responses between these two events. The variable ISI was 
programmed to equally select between the three intervals, averaging a total of 1.5 seconds and 
thus on average, each trial lasted 16.5 seconds. The 160 trials were split into 6 separate runs, 
with two runs lasting a total of 429 seconds or 7 minutes and 9 seconds and four runs lasting a 
total of 445.5 or 7 minutes and 25.5 seconds. For each participant, the run order was randomly 
selected and within each run, the scenarios were also presented in a random order.  
2.2.3 Post-Task Emotional Ratings Task 
In order to determine whether the scenarios and associated decisions aroused the 
anticipated emotions in participants, and to permit correlation of BOLD signal with subjective 
emotion ratings, after the scan, individuals completed a second computer task where they were 
presented with the decisions they made for each trial during the scan and were subsequently 
asked to rate how compassionate or guilty they felt following each decision. Finally, three trait 
scales were also completed by participants to quantify their guilt-proneness and related traits, and 
to examine potential correlations between trait scores and BOLD responses during the task. The 
scales included the Test of Self Conscious Affect (TOSCA, Tangney et al., 1989), Psychopathic 
Personality Index – Revised (PPI-R, Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005), and the Guilt Inventory (Jones 
et al., 2000). The TOSCA is a questionnaire consisting of written responses to a series of brief 
scenarios that may elicit shame, guilt, and pride. It is used primarily to yield indices of shame, 
21 
 
guilt, externalization, detachment/unconcern, alpha pride, and beta pride. The PPI-R is a self-
report questionnaire that asks participants how likely they would engage in a certain behavior. It 
is used to assess three main areas of psychopathic personality: fearless dominance, impulsive 
antisociality, and coldheartedness. The Guilt Inventory is a scale that measures trait guilt, state 
guilt, and moral standards. 
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You made a donation. Your 
donation will help Jeffrey receive 
nourishment he needs to live.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jeffrey is a malnourished 
newborn child whose family is 
unable to provide for him. As a 
result, Jeffrey may not survive. 
Freedom from Hunger can 
help Jeffrey’s parents provide 
appropriate nourishment that 
will allow him to live. 
Will you donate $10 for Jeffrey You made no donation. Jeffrey 
may not survive more than a few 
days. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction (3.5s) 
Choice 1 (2.5s) 
1 - 2.5s 
Will you donate $5 now? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 - 2.5s 
Choice 2 (2.5s) Feedback 2 (2.5s) 
 
+ 
 
+ 
Feedback 1 (2.5s) 
Figure 1. Example of Task Trial 
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2.3 Image Acquisition 
 Data was acquired using a 3-Tesla Siemens Tim Trio MRI scanner with a 32 channel 
head-coil at the Robarts Research Institute. Prior to the task, high-resolution structural-T1-
weighted acquisition of anatomical data of complete brain volume was obtained in the axial 
plane: repetition time (TR) 2300ms, echo time (TE) 2.98 ms, field of view (FOV) 25.6 cm, 192 
slices, voxel size = 1mm3, 256 x 256 matrix. Functional data was acquired using a gradient echo 
planar imaging sequence: 42 contiguous slices of 2 x 2 mm in plane, slice thickness 2.5 mm, TR 
2500ms, TE 30 ms, FOV 24cm, 120 x 120 matrix.  
2.4 Image Processing and Analysis 
 The fMRI data were preprocessed and analyzed using Analysis of Functional 
Neuroimages (AFNI; Cox, 1996) software package. The first 5 volumes of each run were 
discarded to ensure that magnetization equilibrium was reached. The functional images were 
motion corrected by registering all BOLD data to the first volume of the third run. Subjects’ 
functional data were spatially smoothed with a 4 mm full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) 
Gaussian filter. The time series data were normalized by dividing the signal intensity of a voxel 
at each time point by the mean signal intensity of that voxel for each run and multiply the result 
by 100. Resultant regression coefficients represented the percent signal change relative to the 
mean. Regressors were created, characterizing trial condition (active or passive) and the donation 
response of the subject in response to each opportunity to donate (donate or no donate at choice 1 
or choice 2) and also the feedback subsequent to the donation choice. In total 48 regressors were 
created by convolving the train of stimulus events with a gamma-variate hemodynamic response 
function to account for the slow hemodynamic response. Linear regression modelling was 
performed using the 48 regressors to model a first order baseline drift function, producing a beta 
coefficient and t-statistic for each voxel and regressor. 
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Individual anatomical and functional images were normalized to the standardized space 
of Talaraich and Tournoux. The group analysis was then performed through t-tests on whole 
brain data. The threshold was set at p<0.005 (corrected at p < 0.05 for multiple comparisons). 
Threshold correction was done using the 3dClustSim program in AFNI, which applied 10,000 
Monte Carlo simulation iterations on a whole brain EPI matrix. This program calculates the 
number of adjacent clusters required at a specified threshold to determine the likelihood of 
significance.  
Finally, in order to determine whether the BOLD signal in the functional data correlated 
significantly with subjective feelings of guilt, an amplitude modulated analysis was performed. 
The analysis works by taking the subjects’ ratings of feelings of guilt towards each scenario and 
determines voxels that show activation significantly modulated proportionally by this 
behavioural measure of interest. This allowed for us to determine whether any brain regions 
showed a direct correlation between subjective feelings of guilt and BOLD signal. 
2.5 Amplitude Modulated Analysis 
The amplitude modulated analysis takes participants post-hoc trial-by-trial subjective 
ratings of feelings of guilt towards each scenario in the task and identifies voxels that show 
BOLD signal changes that are significantly modulated proportional to this behavioural measure 
of interest. This allowed for us to determine which brain regions may demonstrate activity most 
closely correlated with subjective feelings of guilt.  
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Chapter 3 Results 
3.1 Trait Scales 
Analysis of participants’ scores on the three trait scales that were employed to measure 
levels of guilt proneness and callous and unemotional traits can be found in the tables below. 
Participant scores were not significantly different from standardized scores of similar population 
(Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005, See Appendix B). 
Table 1. Average participant scores on the trait scales employed. TOSCA is the Test of Self-
Conscious Affect and the PPI-R is the Psychopathic Personality Index-Revised 
Guilt Inventory Mean SD Low High Range 
State Guilt 34 6.18 13 50 37 
Moral Standards 44.18 8.33 23 68 45 
Trait Guilt 54.24 12.53 25 97 72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TOSCA Mean SD Low High Range 
Shame 43.82 6.56 35 57 22 
Guilt 57.4 8.07 47 75 28 
Detached 28.12 6.63 21 41 20 
Externalization 23.12 6.82 14 35 21 
Alpha Pride 17.06 6.82 15 25 10 
Beta Pride 17.82 3.26 15 25 10 
PPI-R Mean SD Low High Range 
Machiavellian Egocentricity 41.18 9.26 26 58 32 
Rebellious Nonconformity 32.06 6.98 20 45 25 
Blame Externalization 25.35 4.43 21 36 15 
Carefree Nonplanfulness 33.88 7.07 28 58 30 
Social Influence 41.71 10.52 25 61 36 
Fearlessness 30.82 9.69 14 50 36 
Stress Immunity 30.00 7.29 18 44 26 
Coldheartedness 30.24 8.02 21 47 26 
Virtuous Responding 22.94 5.07 14 31 17 
Deviant Responding 12.59 2.53 10 18 8 
Total 265.24 37.99 202 344 142 
Factor Self-Centred Impulsivity 132.47 19.43 110 174 64 
Factor Fearless Dominance 102.53 21.68 64 145 81 
Inconsistent Responding 15 8.12 2.63 4 15 11 
SubIR40 15.24 3.92 10 23 13 
Inconsistent Responding 40 23.35 5.62 14 35 21 
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3.2 Behavioural Data 
3.2.1 Participant decision types 
Participants’ decision frequencies to donate or not donate during the fMRI task are shown 
below (Table 2). Help/Harm decisions had the highest amount of choices, whereas restitution 
had the least amount of choices. In general, event numbers across the 6 runs of the task were in 
range of the desired number for event related fMRI analysis (>=20) with the exceptions of the 
restitution condition (no donate/donate) and the donate/donate conditions. The Choice1 category 
shows the mean number of choices to help or harm during the first choice phase whereas 
Choice2 shows the average amount of choices made in each of the four possible outcomes.  
Table 2. The average number of harm and help decisions for choice 1 and choice 2 made by 
participants over the course of the fMRI task 
Behavioural Data   
 Choice 1 Choice 2 
 Help Harm  Help/Help Help/Harm Harm/Help Harm/Harm 
Mean 42.06 29.76  13.76 26.41 9.59 18.94 
SD 3.34 3.26  2.85 2.51 2.24 1.86 
 
3.2.2 Trial by trial emotion ratings 
To examine how different trials and decisions prompted social emotions, subjective 
ratings of guilt or compassion obtained from the post-hoc task were averaged across trial type 
(i.e. harm1, harm2, etc.) for each participant (Figure 2). T-tests were then conducted on the mean 
guilt and compassion ratings comparing guilt after the first decision and the second decision. In 
general, after participants chose to help in the second choice, subjective ratings of guilt 
significantly decreased, whereas after choices to harm, subjective ratings of guilt significantly 
increased.  
Specifically, mean ratings of guilt decreased from 2.40 +/- 1.28 to 2.04 +/- 1.23 
(p<0.005) after restitution (Harm-Help) and from 2.45 +/- 1.18 to 2.35 +/- 1.17 (p < 0.05) after 
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Help-Help responses. In the choices to harm, guilt significantly increased from 2.44 +/- 1.19 to 
2.65 +/- 1.15, p<0.005 after Help-Harm choices and from 2.13 +/- 1.18 to 2.28 +/- 1.29 
(p<0.005) after Harm-Harm choices (Figure 2). Feelings of compassion, however, had the 
opposite trend, increasing after harming decisions and decreasing after helpings decisions: the 
Help/Harm condition ratings of compassion decreased from 3.52 +/- 0.98 to 3.13 +/- 1.02 
(p<0.005), the Harm/Harm decreased from 2.55 +/- 1.11 to 2.47 +/- 1.08 (p<0.05), while the 
Harm/Help increased from 2.78 +/- 1.09 to 3.14 +/- 1.06 (p<0.005).  
 
Figure 2. Subjective ratings of feelings of guilt and compassion collapsed into the four possible 
combinations of choices to harm or help individuals in need 
3.2.3 Believability of Charities and Task Premise 
Examination of participant ratings of the believability of the charities (“Did you consider 
these to be real charities?”) demonstrated an average score of 3.5 (S.D. 0.3) out of 5, indicating 
general validity of the task premise (Figure 3). Examination of normality using the Shapiro-Wilk 
test of normality, shows that the distribution of ratings of considering the charities to be real was 
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not normal D(18)=.86, p=0.01). However, examination of the response histogram did not 
demonstrate a bimodal distribution. Similarly, examination of participants’ rating of the 
confidence that their donations to charities would help those in need (“To what extent were you 
confident that your donations would help the charities?”) demonstrated a mean rating of 3.06 
(S.D. 0.26) (Figure 3). The Shapiro-Wilk test indicated responses while responses for the 
confidence that donations did not significantly deviate from normality (D(18)=.90, p>.05). 
3.3 Imaging Data 
3.3.1 Elucidating the neural regions supporting the anticipation and experience of guilt 
To determine the neural regions potentially supporting anticipation of guilt, we conducted 
a t-test on BOLD responses during the interstimulus interval (ISI) that followed a no-donate 
decision vs. the ISI following a donate decision, prior to receiving feedback. This demonstrated 
significantly greater activity following a donation compared to a non-donation in left sided 
regions including the superior, middle and frontal gyri and the middle temporal gyrus. Contrary 
to past research reporting increased activation in the insula during anticipation of guilt, this 
contrast, which we hypothesized would reflect anticipation of guilt, showed no brain regions 
demonstrating greater activation following a harm decision. 
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Figure 3. (A) Post scan ratings of the mean participant responses reflecting the believability of 
the task premise and the perceived helpfulness of donations made by the participant to the 
charities. (B)+(C) Frequency plots of the number of participants for each 
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Table 3. Areas demonstrating greater BOLD activation during Donation versus No Donation 
choices during the interstimulus interval 
 
3.3.2 Determining neural regions supporting decisions of restitution motivated by guilt  
To determine whether acts of restitution reduce activation in regions implicated in the 
experience of guilt, we evaluated whole-brain BOLD signal during restitution responses. That is, 
when participants first did not initially donate to the individual in choice 1, but in the subsequent 
opportunity, chose to donate. We first used t-test to compare BOLD responses during a choice 2 
donate decision that followed a no-donate decision for the same charity (Harm1/Help2) with 
BOLD responses during a choice 2 no-donate decision that followed a no-donate decision for the 
same charity (Harm1/Harm2) responses. This demonstrated increased BOLD signal during the 
restitutive action in the anterior cingulate, while greater activity for a non-restitutive decision 
(i.e. a second harm) was observed in middle and superior temporal gyri (Table 4).  
To determine whether individual differences in guilt-proneness were associated with 
differential neural responses during this form of social decision making and restitution, in a 
follow up analysis, we performed the same voxel-wise contrast including the covariate of Trait 
Guilt scores from the Guilt Inventory. This demonstrated a positive correlation between trait 
guilt scores and BOLD activation in dorsomedial PFC (BA 24/32) and vlPFC (11/47), consistent 
with our predictions.  
Structure L/R BA X Y Z Volume (mm
3
) 
Anticipation  
Help > Harm p < 0.005 
Middle Frontal Gyrus L 8 -40.9 11.8 45.8 972 
Middle Temporal Gyrus L 21 -50.0 -32.3 -6.0 648 
Superior Temporal Gyrus L 38 -56.1 17.5 -10.3 270 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus L 47 -47.0 29.7 -6.0 270 
Superior Frontal Gyrus L 6 -4.5 26.6 59.6 270 
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Table 4. Neural regions active during the Harm1/Help2 vs Harm1/Harm2 contrast 
Structure L/R BA X Y Z Volume (mm
3
) 
Restitution > Harm, p < 0.005 
Anterior Cingulate R 32 19.7 35.1 11.1 108 
Harm > Restitution, p < 0.005 
Middle Temporal Gyrus L 21 -59.1 -35.5 -2.6 189 
Superior Temporal Gyrus L 22 -59.1 10.7 3.3 108 
Superior Temporal Gyrus L 42 -62.1 -33.3 17.3 108 
 
Table 5. Neural regions showing positive correlations with guilt inventory trait scores during the 
active Harm/Help vs Harm/Harm Contrast 
 
 
  
Structure L/R BA X Y Z Volume (mm
3
) 
Restitution > Harm [Guilt Inventory] p < 0.005 
Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex R 11/47 31.8 45.0 -1.6 162 
Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex L 24/32 -7.6 38.8 -1.9 54 
Harm > Restitution [Guilt Inventory] p < 0.005 
Lingual Gyrus L 18 -1.5 -88.0 -5.7 216 
Superior Parietal Lobule L 7 -10.6 -75.7 60.8 135 
Figure 4. Increased  vlPFC and dmPFC activation in guilt-prone individuals during acts of restitution. (A) Positive 
correlations are observed between the guilt inventory and vlPFC and dmPFC during acts of restitution. (B) Scatter 
plot of Trait Guilt scores from the Guilt Inventory with vlPFC activation, R = 0.782 (p < 0.01) and (C) with dmPFC 
activation, R = 0.593 (p < 0.05) 
B C 
A 
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3.3.3 Identify neural regions active during choices to harm or help others 
To identify regions of the brain supporting decisions to help vs. harm another individual, 
we first used t-tests to contrast BOLD responses during donations (Help1) with baseline. This 
demonstrated increased activity in regions that have been implicated in emotion processing and 
decision making such as the anterior cingulate and prefrontal cortices (Figure 5A). Next we 
conducted t-tests on BOLD responses during no donation decisions (Harm1) compared to 
baseline. This demonstrated increased activation in a network of regions partially overlapping 
that identified above for the help contrast including the frontal cortices, but notably the insula 
and temporal poles showed greater activity only during the choices of no donation (Figure 5B). 
Finally, we performed a direct contrast of Help1 vs. Harm1 choice phase BOLD responses using 
a voxel-wise t-test. This demonstrated significantly greater BOLD signal during harm decisions 
(no-donate) in the bilateral insula, amygdala and middle temporal gyrus (Figure 6 and Table 6). 
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Figure 5. Neural regions showing significant BOLD responses compared to baseline during (A) 
donation choices (Help1), and (B) no-donation decisions (Harm1) suggesting that increased 
anterior insular activation may be specific to the harm condition 
 
A B 
Figure 6. Brain regions demonstrating differential BOLD Responses during initial donate vs. no-donate 
decisions. Contrast between Harm vs Help. (A) Increased activity was observed in the (A) left anterior 
insula during no-donation decision (Harm1) when compared t to donations (Help2),  (B) middle temporal 
gyrus, and  (C) amygdala. Initial threshold contrast at p<0.005, corrected to p <0.05 for multiple 
comparisons 
A B C 
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Table 6. Neural regions of interest in a contrast between Harm vs Help 
Structure L/R BA X Y Z Volume (mm3) 
Harm > Help p < 0.005 
Middle Temporal Gyrus L 21 -56.1 -23.0 -5.5 459 
Insula L  -25.8 17.2 -3.2 297 
Amygdala R  25.9 -0.4 -25.7 243 
 
3.4 Active Condition versus Passive Condition Analysis 
As active decisions that one makes which result in harm to another are associated with 
increased feelings of guilt compared to those that result in unintentional harm (Berthoz et al., 
2002 & Finger et al., 2006), we examined the effect of agency upon BOLD signal activation. 
The contrasts between active and passive trials were intended to control for activity in response 
to the stimuli (pictures) and text. Using whole brain voxel-wise t-tests,  we first compared BOLD 
signal during active choice phase when the participant made decisions to harm another individual 
(participant’s choice) vs. the  passive choices made by the computer to harm the individual 
(other’s choice, participant simply pressed button to advance the screen) (Table 7). Of particular 
interest, the right amygdala, medial prefrontal cortex, and left insula showed greater activation 
during the active decision relative to the passive viewing of harm decisions being made (Figure 
7). We then compared the active vs. passive choice phase for decisions to help another individual 
(Table 8). Of particular interest, the medial prefrontal cortex showed greater activation during 
the active phase when compared to the passive phase of helping acts (Figure 8).  
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Figure 7. Regions demonstrating differential BOLD signal responses when comparing active versus 
passive conditions of choices to harm another individual. Greater BOLD responses were observed 
during active harm choices in  the amygdala (A, B) and temporal poles (A), medial prefrontal cortex 
(C,D), and  left anterior insula (E). 
Figure 8. Increased ventromedial prefrontal cortex activation is observed during active relative 
to passive choice condition to help another individual 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
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Table 7. Significantly active clusters from the voxel-wise t-test analysis of the active vs passive 
condition of decisions to harm another individual 
 
 
Table 8. Significantly active clusters from the voxel-wise t-test analysis of the active vs passive 
condition of decisions to help another individual 
Structure L/R BA X Y Z Volume (mm
3
) 
Active > Passive Help1 
Anterior Cingulate L 32 -1.5 41.0 17.9 2808 
Superior Temporal Gyrus L 38 -56.1 8.2 -10.8 702 
Superior Temporal Gyrus R 38 59.1 11.6 -17.8 459 
Middle Temporal Gyrus R 21 50.0 -3.7 -22.3 270 
Medial Frontal Gyrus R 10 1.5 51.5 -8.3 270 
Cingulate Gyrus L 23 -1.5 -18.7 34.4 243 
Superior Temporal Gyrus L 38 -50.0 20.9 -17.3 216 
Posterior Cingulate L  -1.5 -54.3 3.1 189 
Passive vs Active Help 1 
Inferior Parietal Lobe L 40 -62.1 -43.5 36.3 567 
Inferior Parietal Lobe R 40 59.1 -34.3 36.8 162 
 
 
 
Structure L/R BA X Y Z Volume (mm
3
) 
Active > Passive Harm1 
Superior Temporal Gyrus L 38 -53.0 14.5 14.1 3996 
Superior Frontal Gyrus L 8 -13.6 48.7 51.0 3429 
Middle Temporal Gyrus R 21 50.0 -0.6 -22.1 2592 
Medial Frontal Gyrus L 32 -1.5 41.0 17.9 2052 
Amygdala R  25.8 -13.1 -19.2 1161 
Insula L 13/47 -37.9 20.3 -3.0 837 
Medial Frontal Gyrus L 10/11 -1.5 51.5 -8.3 621 
Parahippocampal Gyrus R 27 25.8 -26.1 -5.7 432 
Thalamus L  -1.5 -8.2 8.8 378 
Cingulate Gyrus R 32 10.6 18.4 36.3 378 
Medial Frontal Gyrus L 11 -4.5 36.2 -12.8 351 
Cingulate Gyrus L 32 -4.5 15.3 36.2 351 
Lentiform L  -13.6 -1.2 -7.8 270 
Caudate R  7.6 -2.6 22.2 243 
Middle Temporal Gyrus L 21 -62.1 -13.7 -5.0 216 
Medial Frontal Gyrus R 10 7.6 56.9 9.0 189 
Caudate L  -7.6 3.6 22.5 189 
Insula R 13 37.9 14.1 -3.4 162 
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3.5 Amplitude Modulated Analysis 
Finally, in order to determine whether the BOLD signal in the functional data correlated 
significantly with subjective feelings of guilt, an amplitude modulated analysis was performed. 
In the analysis, all choices (harm or help) are collapsed and two main contrasts were performed. 
The first was a contrast between subjective trial-by-trial ratings of feelings of guilt after choice 1 
versus baseline (zero), where baseline is defined in AFNI as the mean BOLD signal averaged 
across the entire duration of the run, to determine areas that are active to confirm the validity of 
the analysis. This contrast identified that the posterior cingulate, bilateral inferior parietal lobule, 
and the mPFC (see comment) (Table 9). The second contrast was to determine the difference 
between the effects of subjective feelings of guilt in the second choice phase compared to the 
first on BOLD signal. Here we hypothesized that dmPFC and vlPFC regions showing positive 
correlations with trait guilt ratings during restitution may also show positive correlations with 
this measure of state guilt.  However, no significant amplitude modulation of BOLD signal by 
subjective trial-by-trial post-hoc ratings of guilt was found for these regions of PFC (Table 10). 
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Table 9. Neural regions with BOLD responses that are significantly modulated by feelings of 
guilt during choice 1 (harm or help) when compared to baseline 
Structure L/R BA X Y Z Volume (mm
3
) 
Choice 1 > Baseline ratings; p < 0.005 
Precentral Gyrus L 4 -31.8 -25.2 63.4 2646 
Postcentral Gyrus R 40 56.1 -31.9 53.3 1161 
Middle Frontal Gyrus L 6 -22.7 -17.0 63.9 567 
Superior Frontal Gyrus R 6 13.6 4.5 68.3 540 
Lentiform Nucleus L  -19.7 -1.5 -0.7 513 
Cingulate Gyrus R 31 10.6 -40.6 39.8 432 
Medial Frontal Gyrus L 6 -7.6 -10. 67.4 405 
Precuneus R 7 10.6 -71.3 34.9 378 
Superior Temporal Gyrus R 22 53.0 -39.0 7.2 270 
Middle Frontal Gyrus R 8/9 31.8 21.2 43.0 270 
Inferior Parietal Lobe R 40 40.9 -40.9 46.3 243 
Inferior Parietal Lobe L 7/40 -34.8 -50.6 55.5 216 
Superior Temporal Gyrus L 22 -56.1 -36.0 7.4 189 
Post Central Gyrus L 2/40 56.1 -28.9 53.4 189 
 
Table 10. Neural regions that are significantly modulated by feelings of guilt during choice 2 
when compared to the first choice 
Structure L/R BA X Y Z Volume (mm
3
) 
Choice 2 > Choice 1 Guilt Ratings; p < 0.005 
Lentiform Nucleus L  -19.7 -4.5 -4.4 351 
Precentral Gyrus R 6 16.7 -20.2 66.9 297 
Precentral Gyrus L 4 -34.8 -23.0 60.3 270 
Middle Frontal Gyrus L  -37.9 15.8 26.4 162 
Choice 1 > Choice 2 Guilt Ratings 
Superior Frontal Gyrus L 6/8 -22.7 11.5 52.3 189 
Inferior Temporal Gyrus L 20 -65.2 -22.4 -19.8 162 
 
 
 
  
A B 
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Chapter 4 Discussion 
In the current study, we employed a novel social decision-making paradigm using fMRI 
to study the neural correlates of guilt and the subsequent restitutive behaviours. Based on rating 
scales and post-scan interviews, we found that participants were convinced of the believability of 
the study and subjectively experienced feelings of guilt. We observed increased BOLD signal 
during choices of harm when compared to help in the insula, STS, and amygdala suggesting 
potential functions consistent with proposed roles for these regions in processing emotional 
information and aversive cues, and anticipation of negative feedback. We also found that BOLD 
signal within the dmPFC and vlPFC was positively correlated with trait measures of guilt 
proneness during choices of restitution, supporting our hypothesis that these areas may play a 
role in altering behaviour in response to negative social feedback.  
4.1 Behavioural results  
Based on the post-hoc trial-by-trial subjective emotion ratings for guilt and compassion, 
the task successfully elicited these moral emotions, and in a pattern that is dissociable. As 
expected, when individuals did not donate, self-reported feelings of guilt increased. Feelings of 
compassion, on the other hand, showed the opposite trend, decreasing after choices of harm and 
increasing after choices of help. Although we did not make any specific predictions regarding the 
compassion ratings, this result is consistent with prior studies showing that individuals tend to 
help those who they believe are in need (Moll et al 2006). In line with past behavioural research 
(Ketelaar & Au, 2003), analysis of subjective trial by trial ratings of guilt demonstrated a 
decrease in guilt following acts of restitution. In contrast, initial feelings of guilt did not decrease 
following a second choice not to donate to the same individual. Additionally, although ratings for 
other emotions were not obtained, the decision patterns for trials that elicited guilt, a prosocial 
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emotion that is experientially negative, were distinct from those of compassion, a prosocial 
emotion that is experientially positive (Tangney et al., 1996).  
4.2 Anticipatory Guilt 
Contrary to our hypothesis and past research, we did not observe anterior insula 
activation in the contrast between the interstimulus intervals following no donations (harm) vs. 
donations (help). However, in the contrast comparing decisions of harm to help, during the first 
choice, we found increased bold signal within the anterior insula, as well as in the STS and 
amygdala. The finding of this activity pattern during the choice, rather than the subsequent 
interstimulus interval may indicate that the activity is related to prediction calculations at the 
time of decision making. Given the finding of increased anterior insula activity during harm 
relative to help choices, it appears that the insula does play a role in anticipating or calculating 
the potential negative consequences of a decision, at a time proximal to the decision. 
The insula has been hypothesized to play a more general role in decision making, 
particularly in avoiding future negative feedback. There is also evidence showing that the insula 
may play a role in interoception and of emotional states. For example, Shin et al. (2000) has 
found that the anterior insula is activated during the re-experiencing of guilt inducing events. 
Additionally, Chang et al. (2011) found that activity in the insula was correlated with minimizing 
anticipated guilt in the future during the decision making phase of a trust game. However, in a 
prior related study by our group where participants made decisions to assign gains or losses to 
themselves or charities, we found that the anterior insula showed greatest activity when 
unintended outcomes, whether positive or negative, occurred (Greening et al., 2013). 
Additionally, in that study, increased activity of the anterior insula during decision phase was 
correlated with fewer decisions to harm charities. We hypothesized, as a result, that during this 
form of social decision making, the anterior insula was more generally involved with risk-cost 
41 
 
calculation rather than guilt specifically. In line with this, Bossaerts (2010) suggests that the 
anterior insula plays a role in risk tracking, where risk is the uncertainty that cannot be 
eliminated even after learning, and that such increased activation in anterior insula represents 
risk prediction error, that is the probability of making an error. He suggests that in response to 
risk predictions, the body “prepares” itself to respond to these uncertainties, which then, 
according to the James-Lange Somatic Marker Hypothesis, result in emotional states. The 
hypothesis states that physiological changes occur within the body, preceding the conscious 
awareness of emotions, and subsequently the mind then labels the emotion based upon the 
physiological changes and situational context. In support of this, in a study using the Cambridge 
Gamble Task, an insular cortex lesion group showed increased wagers during the task when 
compared to healthy participants, but in a pattern distinct from a vmPFC lesion group. The 
vmPFC lesion group showed increased wagers as well, but did so in accordance to the 
probability of winning; however, insular cortex lesion patients showed increased betting 
regardless of the probability of winning. This latter group was unable to track less favourable 
odds and performed the worst out of all groups, suggesting that the insular cortex is necessary for 
risk tracking and adjustment (Clark et al., 2008). 
In the current task we found increased amygdala activity during choices to not donate to 
charities. The classical view of the amygdala is that it is the fear centre of the brain, where its 
main role is in the acquisition and storage of fearful memories (LeDoux, 2000). It has been 
shown through aversive classical conditioning using acoustic stimuli in rats that lesions to the 
lateral amygdaloid nucleus of the amygdala prevent the conditioning and interfere with both the 
behavioural and autonomic emotional responses, effectively blocking fearful memory formation 
(LeDoux et al., 1990). In humans suffering from bilateral amygdala lesions, it has been shown 
42 
 
that there is a disability to recognize fearful facial expressions, without affecting recognition of 
facial identity (Adolphs et al., 1994). This impairment is due to the failure to fixate gaze upon 
the eyes spontaneously, the most important feature to recognizing fear. This failure to recognize 
fear can be recovered when patients are instructed to fixate upon the eyes (Adolphs et al., 2005). 
As the IAPS photos used include several stimuli with faces and facial expressions, it is possible 
that the increased activity observed in the amygdala in the present task may simply reflect the 
emotional stimuli of the IAPS. However, the amygdala is an area that has been implicated in a 
more general role in modulating the processing of emotional stimuli (Schwartz et al., 2002; 
Cardinal et al., 2002; Sergerie et al., 2007; Heimer et al., 2008). In a texture discrimination task, 
designed to test visual learning, when participants were looking at new pictures, they showed 
increased amygdala activity (Schwartz et al., 2002). It is suggested that this increased functional 
connectivity may enhance visual learning through motivational signals, processing of relevant 
stimuli, and consolidation processes (Holland & Gallagher, 1999 & Vuilleumier et al., 2001). 
Therefore it appears that the amygdala is not only activated during fearful learning or in response 
to fear, but also to detect emotionally salient but unpredictable events, regardless of attentional 
focus or load (Vuilleumier et al., 2001), ultimately leading to shifting of attention to these stimuli 
and modulating behavioural responses and learning (Holland & Gallagher, 1999). In the current 
study, amygdala activity increased when contrasting between decisions of help and decisions of 
harm, which potentially may have been associated with different pictures. In the decisions to 
help, the pictures may have been more negative and therefore more salient and emotionally 
evocative for the participants, resulting in an increased likelihood to donate. Thus while it is 
possible that the IAPS stimuli elicited the amygdalar response, it is not likely the only factor 
driving this response, given that increased activity was seen during choices of harm and not help. 
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Therefore the amygdala activity observed may not simply reflect response to the IAPS, but rather 
seems to be tied to the decision to not donate as well. 
In line with this literature, deficits in empathic perspective taking and emotion attribution 
are correlated with atrophy in the amygdala, along with the insula, STS and regions of the 
temporal poles and frontal lobes in frontotemporal dementia (Eslinger et al., 2011 & Cerami et 
al., 2014). This suggests that these areas within the frontoinsular network play an important role 
in supporting empathy, which is considered a critical emotion for prosocial decision-making. 
Alternatively, a more general role for the amygdala in reflecting the salience of a stimulus or 
situation has been proposed.  Bossaerts (2010) suggests that the amygdala plays a role in tracking 
estimation uncertainty, which represents the uncertainty that can be reduced with additionally 
learning. Adams et al. (2003) also showed that ambiguity resulted in greater amygdala activation, 
when studying angry and fearful facial expressions by manipulating gaze in the facial 
expressions. Fearful expressions with direct gaze and angry expressions with averted gaze 
elicited greater activity in the amygdala, in both of these, the source of threat is unknown to the 
participant and is thus more produces ambiguity. Similarly, this amygdalar activation has been 
replicated in potentially ambiguous facial expressions of fear, sadness, happiness, and anger, thus 
further outlining the role of the amygdala not only in fear but more general emotional processing 
and ambiguity disentangling (Yang et al., 2002). Thus the amygdala has a potential role in 
determining biological and social relevant information (Sander et al., 2003 & Sergerie et al., 
2007). 
Prior studies looking at guilt and embarrassment have found activation within the left 
STS for both of these social emotions (Takahashi et al., 2004 & Finger et al., 2006). The STS is 
typically activated across a variety of tasks featuring social stimuli or social interactions 
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(Takahashi et al., 2004, Singer et al., 2004, Harris et al., 2005, Finger et al., 2006, Lee & Harris, 
2013). It has been proposed that the STS processes social cues that reveal communicative 
intentions of others through the analysis of eye-gaze direction, facial expressions, body 
movements, and other types of biological motions (Redcay, 2008). In our current study, we 
hypothesize that the STS activity reflects processing of the facial expression and ultimately the 
intention of the subject within the IAPS stimuli. In conjunction with the amygdala, we suggest 
this information from the STS regarding the goals and intentions of the individuals and how they 
are in need contributes to ToM processing and empathy for the depicted individuals, and is 
integrated into cost/benefit calculations/predictions in the insula and amygdala. 
4.3 Neural correlates of restitution: Roles of vlPFC and dmPFC 
When restitution was contrasted with choices of harm, that is comparing Harm followed 
by Help choices (Harm/Help) with Harm followed by Harm choices (Harm/Harm), we found 
increased activation in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC, BA 32).The ACC is an area that, in 
the past, has been referenced to as the dmPFC, although the ACC can include broader and more 
ventral prefrontal regions to the dmPFC (Venkatraman & Huettel, 2013). The ACC and 
neighboring regions of mPFC have long been implicated in decision-making, emotional 
awareness, and risk uncertainty and anticipation (Craig, 2009). Of interest, the ACC is typically 
co-activated with the insula during interoception, particularly during viewing of fearful faces, 
and perceptual decision making (Craig, 2009).  This division of the medial frontal cortex has 
been suggested to use reward and other outcome information to guide future behaviours (Walton 
et al., 2004 & Rushworth et al., 2005). Waytz et al. (2011) also found that the dmPFC predicted 
altruistic behaviours, where highest activity was correlated with the greatest amount of money 
donated to others.   
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To test the hypothesis that persons more prone to guilt may experience greater drives 
towards restitutive actions, we included a measure of Trait Guilt as a covariate in the restitution 
contrast. We found a positive correlation with trait guilt scores and activity specifically in vlPFC 
and mPFC (anterior cingulate cortex) during the acts of restitution. That is, in participants that 
are more prone to guilt, there is greater activation in these two areas. These results are consistent 
with and extend results from a previous study in the lab that used a guilt-inducing passive 
sentence viewing task and found that these two areas became activated during moral and social 
transgressions, which also was correlated with feelings of guilt. It was hypothesized that these 
areas are important for processing aversive social information in order to facilitate a behavioural 
change from the one that elicited the negative feedback to a more advantageous option (Finger et 
al., 2006). More recently, Morey et al. (2012) employed a similar task where participants read 
hypothetical scenarios that were designed to induce guilt as a result of harming another or 
harming yourself. Participants then rated their feelings of guilt subsequent to reading the stories, 
and they found that guilt intensity was correlated with the dmPFC, vlPFC, frontopolar cortex, 
and supramarginal gyrus. 
These roles for dmPFC and vlPFC in social decision making and response selection are 
supported by the literature regarding their role in across a variety of social and non-social 
cognitive tasks. The dmPFC has been found show activity during tasks designed to induce 
erroneous responses, such as the counting Stroop (Bush et al., 1998), Continuous Performance 
Test (Carter et al., 1998), and the flanker task (Botvinick et al., 1999), and greater activity is 
observed with increasing degrees of conflict between the decisions. This research has suggested 
a role of the dmPFC in monitoring errors. Subsequent studies have shown that this signal triggers 
behavioural or strategic changes that prevent subsequent errors (Ullsperger and von Cramon, 
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2003; Brown and Braver, 2005; Kennerly et al., 2006). The dmPFC has also been found to be 
activated during a charity task, when assigning a loss to the charity relative to assigning a loss to 
oneself. It was suggested this increased dmPFC activity may reflect greater decision conflict for 
decisions to harm another (Greening et al., 2013). Similar to the dmPFC, the vlPFC has been 
found to be activated in response to negative feedback that prompts behavioural changes such as 
in reversal learning paradigms (Cool et al., 2002; Mitchell et al. 2009).  
  Thus, results from the present study support our previous finding of increased activation 
in dmPFC and vlPFC during guilt-inducing scenarios and extend the hypothesis to suggest that, 
particularly in guilt prone individuals, feedback depicting harm to another is processed similar to 
an error in dmPFC, which in turn primes vlPFC to modify the causative behaviour. Of interest is 
why individuals with greater guilt proneness may therefore show greater activation in these 
areas- i.e. how is a greater “social error signal” generated in dmPFC in some individuals. We 
propose that guilt prone individuals are more responsive to aversive social feedback and are 
more likely to engage in subsequent behavioural changes as a result of increased empathy or 
differences in risk prediction calculations, which may relate to potential feelings of guilt. 
However, we did not observe significant correlations between the guilt inventory and the neural 
regions such as STS, amygdala and insula implicated in processing the emotional state and needs 
of the charity individuals. This lack of signal may be secondary to insufficient power, as the 
participants were a community sample, not specifically recruited for high or low guilt trait 
scores. An alternate model, though we suggest a less likely one, may be that as opposed to the 
individual’s guilt proneness resulting in greater error signals, it could be that the greater error 
signals prompt increased feelings of empathy. Further investigation to confirm which model may 
be more accurate could be addressed  by recruiting two more extreme populations, one that is 
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high in guilt proneness and one that is low, and contrasting the BOLD signal during feedback 
following a harm decision and during restitutive decisions. This would allow us to further 
determine whether increased activity is observed in the amygdala, STS, and insula for 
individuals high in guilt-proneness, and whether these signals correlate with subsequent signal in 
the vlPFC and dmPFC in the subsequent decision phase. 
4.4 Amplitude Modulated Analysis 
Subjective ratings of guilt showed that participants felt significantly less guilty after 
restitutive behaviours. The goal of the amplitude modulated analysis was to determine whether 
subjective feelings of guilt would modulate the BOLD activity within any regions of interest, on 
a trial by trial basis However, using a whole-brain voxel-wise approach we did not find any 
significant correlation with the subjective guilt ratings and BOLD signal in our a-priori areas of 
interest including the insula, amygdala, and STS. The lack of results may have been due to 
potential unreliability of the post-hoc explicit recall of subconscious feelings on over 100 trials 
during the scanning procedure. This problem could be addressed in future studies by including 
more objective autonomic measures of emotional states in real-time such as heart rate or skin 
conductance. These measures have been used in paradigms that have been designed to study 
guilt and have found physiologic arousal when experiencing guilt (Eisenberg et al., 1991; Gamer 
et al., 2008; Wahlund et al., 2010; Oliveira-Silva & Goncalves 2011; Kouchaki et al., 2013).  
Although these measures may not directly be able to identify guilt specifically and are related 
more to general arousal, it is possible to use the differences between these measures and the 
participants’ baseline to determine neural patterns that may reflect internal emotional states. 
4.5 Limitations, potential pitfalls and confounds 
Guilt is a complex social emotion that is often grouped with two other emotions, shame 
and embarrassment, due to various similarities in the situations upon which they are elicited. As 
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a result, there is always the potential confound that the emotion that the paradigm was designed 
to isolate may result in overlap with these other social emotions. A potential way to disentangle 
these emotions may be to specify whether others have knowledge of their actions, as guilt should 
occur in response to harm to a victim, whether or not it is witnessed, whereas shame may vary as 
a function of others knowledge of one’s action. Another point that may be of concern is the 
success of the deception used in our task and the difficulty in replicating “real life” situations and 
emotions while within the MRI scanner. Although participants’ post scan interview ratings 
showed that some participants, while not necessarily believing the story of the individuals in 
need, still believed in the existence of the charities and that donations would actually help those 
in need. However, past studies have found that individuals who role play often “take on” the 
emotions and identities of their role (Haney et al., 1973). Thus although there are participants 
who fall below the median value of the believability scale, it does not necessarily mean they 
were not generating the emotions or evoking the same neural regions.  
Another complicating factor in the design of the study linked decisions of harm towards 
another individual with benefits towards the self. Thus during the decision making process, 
factors aside from guilt or empathy, such as considering one’s own needs and self-interest could 
potentially influence and confound the final decisions. However, this design was selected for its 
ecological validity as decisions to help another typically involve a cost to oneself. A final point 
that may be of concern is the power of the results, specifically, in the event number for the trials 
of restitution, which was lower than the other possible outcomes of choices. The current study 
used a novel task design and the current behavioural results show that participants engaged in the 
task experienced guilt and engaged in restitutive behaviours in response to guilt. The results of 
the study, however, show an imbalance in number of responses in the four possible categories of 
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behaviours (Help-Help, Help-Harm, Harm-Harm, Harm-Help), which may affect the power of 
the statistical analyses. Specifically, there was a significantly lesser amount of responses for the 
restitutive behaviours (Harm/Help: 9.59 +/- 2.24 vs Help/Help: 13.76 +/- 2.85, Help/Harm: 26.41 
+/- 2.51, Harm/Harm: 18.94 +/- 1.86). Thus in order to increase these responses, providing 
stronger negative feedback in response to decisions to not donate to charities may be a potential 
way to balance the responses. As we did not see significant correlations between the post-hoc 
trial-by-trial guilt ratings and BOLD signal in regions such as those active during harm 
decisions, it may be of consideration to ask participants to rate feelings of guilt subsequent to 
each story, immediately after making the donation decision, in order to reduce confounds related 
to post-hoc memory of a emotions for a large number of trials. This would also reduce the 
potential for to manipulate answers in hindsight, when shown their original donate or no-donate 
responses. 
 Another limitation is the predictability of the task, where the participants may have 
learned that they would always be presented with two opportunities to donate. As a result, 
participants may have made decisions for both choice 1 and choice 2 prior to the actual choice 
phase, which could obscure specific neural signals related to guilt and restitution. A potential 
way to resolve this issue in future studies would be to alter the design to be less predictable by 
only offering a second choice randomly and by varying the dollar amount for donations in both 
the choices. 
 Although only the Guilt Inventory showed correlation with the imaging data, this result 
and possibly the lack of correlation with the other trait measures may be a result of gender-
specific differences. Although there are no studies that have studied-specific differences in the 
experience of guilt or compassion, there are different sets of normalized results for males and 
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females within these trait scales, it is possible that the intensity of ratings may differ, which may 
then also be reflected in activation intensity. However, the current study was not designed to 
look at gender-specific activations, therefore it is not powered to do so, but would of interested 
for future studies. 
 
4.6 Future Directions 
A potential follow up analysis for the current study would be functional connectivity 
analysis, which determines whether the areas of interest show are functionally connected by 
analyzing the time course of activation during the task. Additionally, another follow up analysis 
would be the use of multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) and a support vector machine (SVM).  
SVMs are used to predict behavioural choices based upon a subset of the data, while the MVPA 
provides patterns of activation that can be used to entrain the SVM. In our current study, this 
analysis would serve to further allow us to conclude that the areas of the brain that were found to 
be correlated with resitutive behaviours support these behaviours. That is, based on the patterns 
of activation observed during choice and feedback one, if the SVM is able to predict the 
decisions of the participants for choice 2 correctly, then a conclusion towards the BOLD signal 
observed in these areas of interest supporting these behaviours is much stronger.  
We found a correlation with guilt and restitution related activation in dmPFC and vlPFC, 
but no significant restitution-related activity in these regions in the absence of the covariate. This 
suggests that power to detect such activity may be increased by examining healthy controls that 
score on the extreme ends of the spectrum. This would also allow us to determine whether the 
guilt inventory result replicates in the population that scores higher on the scale.  
One of the goals of the study was to determine the neural correlates of guilt and 
restitution, both of which are lost early on in the disease progression of FTD and psychopathic 
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personality disorder. It will be of interest to replicate the study in individuals suffering from 
psychopathic personality disorder to observe the changes in the BOLD signal responses or 
atrophy in the areas of interest (amygdala, insula, STS) identified in harm decision  in the current 
study. It is expected that there will be a decrease in activation within these regions, due to the 
lack of empathy within this population. Given their empathy deficits, it will be unlikely that 
these individuals will engage in restitutive behaviours, thus the vlPFC and dmPFC results may 
not be replicable within this population.  
4.7 Conclusions 
The present study describes a novel fMRI paradigm that provided participants the 
opportunity to actively make decisions that would help or harm a person in need, and which 
featured feedback designed to elicit feelings of guilt. The amygdala, insula, and STS were found 
to be activated during choices of harm when compared to choices of help. We also demonstrated 
that the vlPFC and dmPFC may be key regions supporting decisions of restitution. Our findings 
support and extend prior models of social decision-making, where it is proposed that the STS and 
amygdala work in conjunction to support empathy through their functions in processing 
emotional expressions, other’s intentions and modulating emotional salience, feeding this 
information to the anterior insula to predict future outcomes of behaviours. When a decision 
resulting in negative feedback is made, if weighted as sufficiently costly to the individual, the 
vlPFC and dmPFC are engaged and facilitate a change in response to alleviate the harm done 
when possible. 
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Insula 
Predicting future uncertainties 
and potential outcomes 
(anticipatory guilt) 
Superior Temporal Sulcus 
Gaze and expression processing, 
Theory of Mind 
Dorsomedial and ventrolateral PFC 
Facilitate change in behaviour prompted by 
negative feedback or aversive information 
Amygdala 
Aversive Emotional Processing, 
gaze direction 
Figure 7. Hypothesized model of social decision making and restitution 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Experiment Instructions 
In this experiment, we are studying brain responses when humans make charitable 
donations.  You will be shown a list of charities with a short description of each. While in the 
MRI scanner, you will be presented with individuals that are in need of help from these various 
charities and you will be given the opportunity to help to people like them by donating to these 
charities. You will have a limited amount of money to donate to the charities, thus please be sure 
to allocate the funds according to individuals you most want to support. For example, if you feel 
strongly towards one individual, you may choose to donate twice to the individual. In contrast, if 
you are sympathetic but are not particularly passionate about the individual’s situation, you may 
choose not to donate. However, if you are sympathetic towards individuals but do not want to 
donate to them due to the high cost, you may be allowed to donate a lesser amount to them on 
your second choice. Remember that you will not be able to donate to all individuals that you will 
read about and will inevitability be unable to help some of them. Also, these individuals are in 
extreme need and therefore any amount of money donated will be highly useful to help them 
through their situations.  
You will be presented with 26 scenarios of different individuals during each run of the 
experiment. You will complete 6 runs of the task. During the run, you will have two 
opportunities to donate to any given individual and you will be able donate to roughly 16 times 
in total (for approximately half of the trials). You will be paid a bonus for participating that will 
be a proportion of the money you choose not to donate. 
There are two types of scenarios that you will encounter during the experiment. In the 
active scenario, after being presented with the situation of the individual, you will be prompted 
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with the question of “Will you donate $10 for [name] today?”, where [name] will be the name of 
the individual that was introduced prior to the screen. You will then make a decision and push 
the button corresponding to that decision; 1 for donate and 2 for no donate. Also, every time you 
are asked to donate, you will have 3.5 seconds to make a decision. If you do not make a decision 
during this time, you will be prompted to respond faster. 
In the passive scenario, you will be presented with a scenario again, but the prompt 
screen will this time say “Will a $10 donation be made for [Name] today?”. In these scenarios, 
an external source will decide whether a donation will or will not be made and you are only 
required to prompt the advancement of the screen by pressing either button 1 or 2. Keep in mind, 
however, that your button press will have no effect upon the subsequent decision that is made by 
the external source. This external source, however, will affect the amount of money you have 
available to donate and will thus affect your bonus.  
Active scenario: “Will you donate $10 for [name] today?” 
Passive scenario: Will a $10 donation be made for [Name] today?” 
Once you have run out of money, you will be informed of this, and will be prompted to 
respond with the no donation button (button 2) for the remainder of the trials. While it is still 
possible press button 1, there will be no effect, and you will still be unable to donate any money. 
Finally, please remember that these individuals are in extreme need and therefore any amount of 
money donated will be a great help to them. 
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Appendix B: Subscale Means and Standard Deviations of Trait Scales for College Students 
Guilt Inventory Mean SD Low High Range 
State Guilt 27.10 6.87 10 50 40 
Moral Standards 47.21 7.93 23 71 48 
Trait Guilt 54.96 12.33 23 97 74 
 
 
  
TOSCA Mean SD Low High Range 
Shame 43.21 8.96 N/A N/A N/A 
Guilt 61.83 6.84 N/A N/A N/A 
Detached 31.84 5.49 N/A N/A N/A 
Externalization 38.05 8.01 N/A N/A N/A 
Alpha Pride 20.09 2.58 N/A N/A N/A 
Beta Pride 20.8 2.72 N/A N/A N/A 
PPI-R Mean SD Low High Range 
Machiavellian Egocentricity 44.98 8.99 N/A N/A N/A 
Rebellious Nonconformity 33.59 7.83 N/A N/A N/A 
Blame Externalization 30.62 7.45 N/A N/A N/A 
Carefree Nonplanfulness 36.34 7.25 N/A N/A N/A 
Social Influence 48.40 8.96 N/A N/A N/A 
Fearlessness 38.24 8.73 N/A N/A N/A 
Stress Immunity 35.80 7.22 N/A N/A N/A 
Coldheartedness 33.10 6.79 N/A N/A N/A 
Virtuous Responding 24.75 4.67 N/A N/A N/A 
Deviant Responding 12.64 2.54 N/A N/A N/A 
Total 301.06 31.26 N/A N/A N/A 
Factor Self-Centred Impulsivity N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Factor Fearless Dominance N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Inconsistent Responding 15 8.49 3.12 N/A N/A N/A 
SubIR40 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Inconsistent Responding 40 2.29 6.50 N/A N/A N/A 
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